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What makes a good monitor?  Embodied in recent regulatory requirements is the notion 
that independent directors provide a particular type of objective, shareholder-minded 
monitoring.
1  At the same time, little is known about the characteristics of independent 
directors, or the factors that influence the selection process of these directors.  It seems 
almost necessary that a senior officer or board member has some relationship with, or 
prior knowledge of, a potential independent director in order to ensure they have 
enough information to be able to recommend the member for board election.  This 
reality need not be problematic, as although it could be that this relationship skews the 
view of these “independent” directors, it could also reduce information asymmetries 
regarding the potential value of the director for the given board.
2   
In this paper we exploit a unique, hand-collected database of independent 
directors to test the hypothesis that boards appoint directors who, while technically 
independent according to regulatory definitions, nonetheless may be overly sympathetic 
to management.  To do so we investigate a subset of independent directors for whom we 
have detailed, micro-level data on their views regarding the firm prior to being 
appointed to the board.  We use these track records to compare the roles of optimism 
(i.e., hiring a cheerleader for management) versus skill (i.e., hiring an objective and able 
observer) in the board appointment process.  Focusing on ex-ante, observable 
characteristics of the independent directors themselves allows us to directly evaluate the 
objectivity and potential efficacy of independent directors based solely on their actual 
opinions about the firm in question.   
  The agents we examine are former sell-side analysts who end up serving on the 
board of companies they previously covered.  Motivating our empirical strategy is the 
fact that 91% of the board members of the appointing firms in our sample are on the 
                                                            
1 See, for example, the SEC’s press release on November 4, 2003, in which the SEC approved new rules 
proposed and adopted by the New York Stock Exchange and the Nasdaq Stock Market requiring 
widespread strengthening of corporate governance standards for listed companies.  The new rules 
"establish a stricter, more detailed definition of independence for directors and require the majority of 
members on listed companies’'boards to satisfy that standard...Pursuant to NYSE Section 303A(2) of the 
NYSE Manual, no director would qualify as "independent" unless the board affirmatively determines that 
the director has no material relationship with the company (either directly or as a partner, shareholder or 
officer of an organization that has a relationship with the company)." See 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-48745.htm for more details.  See also Duchin et al. (2008) for a review 
of recent changes to the regulatory requirements for corporate boards. 
2 See Adams and Ferreira (2007) for a discussion of the tradeoffs involved in board construction. Hiring Cheerleaders — Page 2 
 
board both at the time the analyst was covering the firm and at the time of the 
subsequent board appointment, suggesting that the firm-analyst relationships we explore 
exhibit a great deal of continuity.  Further, unlike former CEOs or other senior 
executives who serve on corporate boards, for whom past performance attribution is 
complicated by the fact that firm performance is difficult to disentangle from individual 
performance, sell-side analysts’ opinions and performance can be easily assessed.  We 
can explicitly compute measures of skill/ability and optimism by examining the 
composition and stock return performance of analysts’ buy/sell recommendations.  In 
doing so we find evidence that boards appoint overly optimistic analysts who are also 
poor relative performers. 
  In particular, board-appointed analysts issue significantly more positive 
recommendations on companies that subsequently appoint them to the board; both 
relative to the other stocks they cover, and relative to other analysts covering these 
same stocks. The magnitude of this result is large: 82.0% of these recommendations are 
strong-buy or buy recommendations, compared to 56.9% for all other analyst 
recommendations (an over 25% difference). In regressions of recommendation levels 
(1=Strong Sell, 5=Strong Buy) on an appointment dummy (equal to 1 if the analyst 
recommending the given stock is subsequently appointed to the board of directors of 
that firm), the coefficient on appointment implies an increase in favorableness of rating 
from between a Hold and a Buy for the average recommendation to between a Buy and 
Strong Buy for appointed recommendations. This result is nearly three times as large as 
the optimism effect associated with affiliation (here a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
given firm has an underwriting relationship with the analyst’s brokerage house), which 
is the subject of a vast analyst literature (see, for example, Lin and McNichols (1998), 
Lin et al. (2005), Michaely and Womack (1999), Hong and Kubik (2003)).   
  Additionally, we find that board-appointed analysts exhibit poor relative 
performance on their stock recommendations on appointing firms.  For example, we find 
that appointed analysts issue 60-90% more directionally incorrect calls on stock 
recommendations for firms that appoint them compared to the typical analyst 
recommendation.  Also, while the typical analyst upgrade earns a significant 9.4% in the 
year following the upgrade, upgrades by appointed analysts on appointing firms earn Hiring Cheerleaders — Page 3 
 
only an insignificant 3.6%. Finally, we show that appointed analysts demonstrate 
inferior  overall forecasting ability, both for earnings forecasts and for stock 
recommendations, across the entire portfolio of stocks they cover.  Thus, while it is true 
that an optimistic analyst may simply be more likely to accept a board seat than an 
otherwise similar analyst, our results imply that firms are either appointing the wrong 
analysts, or that firms should simply demand zero analysts if the only willing supply 
consists of biased and poor performing analysts.  
  To get a richer understanding of the behavior of board-appointed analysts, we 
also explore the dynamics of optimism in our sample.  In doing so we find that 
appointed analysts’ optimism is stronger: a) when firms have high short interest, b) 
before times of increased stock issuance by the firm, and c) when the last 
recommendation issued on the firm was a downgrade.  All of these instances are times 
when a manager would most welcome good news on his stock.  Further, we find no 
evidence of optimism in the earnings forecasts of appointed analysts, which helps to rule 
out the possibility that appointed analysts are simply uniformly optimistic about all 
prospects of the appointing firm, in contrast to a specific pattern of recommendations 
that benefits the managers of the firm (i.e., sympathetic to management).  We provide 
additional evidence on this distinction between being optimistic versus being 
sympathetic towards management when we demonstrate below that CEO compensation 
increases post-analyst-appointment. 
  Of course, appointing overly bullish analysts need not imply bad monitoring.  It 
is possible that optimistic directors might facilitate productive cooperation and 
communication among board members, or have ideas on new strategies and directions 
for growth.  To explore these issues, we examine the behavior and performance of 
appointing firms after these appointments.  We find that appointing firms engage in 
increased questionable behavior after the appointment of these analysts: appointing 
firms significantly increase their earnings management behavior, reporting higher 
discretionary accruals post-appointment relative to the pre-appointment period. Finally, 
the post-appointment performance of these firms is poor: a calendar-time portfolio of 
appointing stocks underperforms a portfolio of non-appointing stocks by 1.3-2.0% per 
month in the year after these appointments.   Hiring Cheerleaders — Page 4 
 
  To overcome the potential endogeneity of analyst board appointments, we 
instrument for the appointment of a cheerleader analyst by exploiting the post-Global 
Settlement time period when analysts were widely scrutinized and scorned and hence in 
low demand to serve as potential directors.  We use this exogenous shock to the 
desirability/availability of analysts in the pool of potential directors as an instrument 
for the actual appointment of cheerleader analysts.  We first show that Global 
Settlement did have a significant negative impact on the appointment of analysts to 
boards of directors (first-stage).  We then find that the instrumented-appointment of 
analysts to the board led to a large and significant increase in earnings management 
post-(instrumented)-appointment.  We also examine CEO compensation in this IV 
framework, and find that appointing firms significantly increase CEO compensation 
post-appointment of a cheerleader analyst, suggesting that appointing firms’ boards are 
sympathetic to management post-appointment, despite the poor subsequent stock return 
performance.   
  Overall, our findings provide new evidence on the board selection process, and on 
the characteristics of independent directors. Our unique micro-level data on analyst 
board appointments enables us to investigate the track records of a subset of 
independent directors in a clean and direct way in order to investigate their optimism 
and expertise with respect to the appointing firms.  To our knowledge, although papers 
have used measures of director relationships, this paper is the first to empirically 
document this phenomenon of firms actively appointing board "cheerleaders" (i.e., 
board members who have an empirically documented optimistic view of the 
firm/management, but who possess little skill in assessing the firm or its prospects, 
suggesting them to be unsuitable monitors).  Since these cheerleaders are of course 
technically labeled as independent directors, our findings call into question the idea that 
increasing the representation of independent directors on the board is by definition a 
positive step.  
Additionally, our results on the behavior and ultimate performance of the 
appointing firms suggest that exploring the past track records and backgrounds of board 
members is a useful way to identify cross-sectional variation in firm governance quality.  
Although we focus on subset of board appointments in this paper, we believe our results Hiring Cheerleaders — Page 5 
 
help shed light on independent directorships in general.  Even in this pool of former sell 
side analysts of the firm, who are potentially very informed and skilled monitors, firms 
either seem to be demanding (or at the very least settling) for overly optimistic analysts 
who are poor relative performers.  Collectively our results suggest that the board 
appointment process involving other classes of independent directors, where the same 
potential monitoring skill might not be present, could be even more problematic.   
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I provides background 
and motivation. Section II describes the data. Section III reports our results on the 
positive bias in the recommendations of board-appointed analysts. Section IV documents 
the relative underperformance of appointed analysts. Section V explores the dynamics of 
appointed analysts’ recommendations. Section VI examines the post-appointment 
behavior and performance of appointing firms, including the IV estimation for board 
appointments.  Section VII discusses the distinction between optimism in general versus 
sympathy towards management, as well as the interplay between the supply and 
demand for biased analysts.  Section VIII concludes.  
  
I.  Background and Motivation 
Our data and approach allow us to investigate the micro foundations of several 
competing views on how boards function.  Specifically, by looking at observable 
measures of the optimism and ability of a subset of board appointees, we can directly 
test the hypothesis that boards engage in a type of "window-dressing" when appointing 
independent directors.  This view, embraced by many skeptics of recent regulatory 
reforms and articulated by Romano (2005), maintains that setting numerical targets for 
independent directors will not improve corporate governance (nor have any effect on 
firm performance) because managers can still appoint directors who are independent 
according to regulatory definitions, but nonetheless still overly sympathetic to 
management.  
   A competing viewpoint, which forms the foundation of recent regulatory changes 
(including the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), as well as rules enacted by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and 
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)), argues that independent directors Hiring Cheerleaders — Page 6 
 
are objective, shareholder-focused monitors of management, and therefore that 
increasing their representation on boards should uniformly improve corporate 
governance.  Independent directors, under this view, are custodians of shareholder 
interests, whose presence on the board help reduce agency problems and improve firm 
performance.  
Yet another hypothesis suggests that boards are optimally constructed so as to 
maximize shareholder value, such that any mandated increases in board independence 
will likely hurt firm performance.  Not surprisingly, since all three of these theories have 
predictions on how changes in board independence may affect future performance, the 
typical approach in the literature to evaluating these stories has been to relate measures 
of board independence (e.g., increases in the percentage of independent directors on a 
board) to future performance of the firm.  The problem with this strategy is that board 
composition is endogenous, so identifying a link between board independence and firm 
performance is difficult (even if one exists) if poor performance causes an increase in 
board independence (as in Hermalin and Weisbach (1998)), or if other factors cause 
comovement in board composition and firm performance (as in Harris and Raviv 
(2007)).  Recent theory also suggests that board independence is unlikely to have a 
uniform effect across firms, and that the effectiveness of independent directors may 
depend on the information environment of the firm (see Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), 
Raheja (2005), Adams and Ferreira (2007), and Harris and Raviv (2007)).
3   
Perhaps as a result of these issues, many studies fail to find a strong relation 
between board independence and firm performance (see, for example, Bhagat and Black 
(2002), Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), Fields and Keys (2003)).  However, more recent 
studies (see, for example, Dahya and McConnell (2007) and Duchin et al. (2008)) 
identify exogenous changes in board structure by exploiting shifts in regulatory 
environments and provide evidence that increases in board independence precede 
improvements in firm performance.  In particular, Duchin et al. (2008) find that the 
effect of outside directors on firm performance is small on average; however, consistent 
                                                            
3 Note that incorporating information considerations into evaluations of board composition builds off a 
long-understood notion (see Berle and Means (1932), Fama and Jensen (1983), Jensen (1993)) that the 
effectiveness of outside directors may be limited by their inferior information relative to corporate 
insiders. Hiring Cheerleaders — Page 7 
 
with the recent theory above, the effect of outside directors on firm performance varies 
according to the information environment of a firm: outside directors are effective when 
the cost of acquiring information about a firm is low, but ineffective when the cost of 
acquiring information is high.   
The paper most closely related to ours is perhaps Brickley et al. (1999), who 
investigate a sample of former CEOs who end up on boards of companies after they 
retire as CEOs.
4  Their focus is on the managerial incentives that these possible future 
board appointments provide for CEOs during their tenures, but they do provide 
evidence that boards may consider ability and merit when selecting directors by showing 
that the likelihood of post-retirement board service by a CEO is positively related to the 
stock market performance of that CEO’s firm during her tenure.
5  The problem of 
course with using CEOs and senior executives is that past performance attribution is 
complicated by the fact that firm performance is difficult to disentangle from individual 
performance.
6  In addition, in the majority of past CEO appointments (outside CEOs 
onto the board of another firm), one cannot calculate skill of the CEOs with respect to 
the exact firm they subsequently serve on the board of, making it more difficult to 
assess their suitability for the appointing firm in particular.  By contrast, our focus on 
sell-side analysts alleviates this issue, since we can explicitly compute measures of 
skill/ability and optimism for each analyst with respect to the appointing firm (and 
with respect to her entire portfolio); in doing so, we can directly test the true track 
record and implicit firm motivation for our sample of appointed independent directors. 
 
II.  Data 
  The data in this study are collected from several sources. We obtain biographical 
information and past employment history for directors and senior company officers from 
                                                            
4 See also Lee (2007) for more recent evidence on post-retirement board service by former CEOs. In 
addition to this work, Stern and Westphal (2006) use survey evidence to find that managers who engage 
in ingratiatory behavior toward CEOs are more likely to receive appointments on boards with the CEO. 
5 See also Kaplan and Reishaus (1990) and Gilson (1990), as well as a body of empirical research 
(summarized in Yermack (2006)) that argues that what matters for firm performance are the 
qualifications of outside directors, such as financial expertise (DeFond et al. (2005)), business knowledge 
and experience (Fich (2005)), and the time commitments of outside directors (Fich and Shivdasani 
(2006)).        
6 See Bertrand and Schoar (2003).   Hiring Cheerleaders — Page 8 
 
Boardex of Management Diagnostics Limited. The Boardex data contain relational links 
among boards of directors and other corporate officials. Links in the dataset are 
constructed by cross-referencing employment history, educational background and 
professional qualifications. For each firm, we use the link file to reconstruct the annual 
time series of identities of board members and senior officers of the firms.  
We use analysts’ stock recommendation data from the I/B/E/S historical 
recommendation detail file, which codes recommendations on a common scale from 1 to 
5, where 1=Strong Buy, 2=Buy, 3=Hold, 4=Sell, and 5=Strong Sell.  We search public 
filings and other miscellaneous information available over the World Wide Web to 
identify security analysts that are subsequently appointed to the board of directors of 
the companies they follow. We start by identifying all analysts on the I/B/E/S tape 
who provide at least one recommendation on a domestic stock between 1993 and 2006. 
For each analyst, I/B/E/S provides a numeric identifier, the analyst’s last name, the 
initial of his/her first name, and the analyst’s brokerage house. Since our data 
construction methodology involves name searches, we delete observations with multiple 
names for a given analyst numeric identifier or multiple analyst and brokerage 
identifiers for a given name. Finally, we discard teams, as attribution of the 
recommendation is less clean in these cases.   
We look at analysts exiting the industry during our sample period and generate 
an initial list of potential hires by matching the analyst’s initials and last name to the 
names of all board members of all firms covered by the analyst during her tenure. For 
example if analyst J. Smith covered stock ABC and XYZ between 1994 and 1998 and 
exits the industry in 1998, we search the list of directors of ABC and XYZ for board 
members named J* SMITH appointed in or after 1998.  Finally we hand-check each 
entry from this initial list in order to positively identify analysts appointed to the board 
of firms they used to cover. To do so, we search press releases regarding the 
appointment (which usually describe the board member’s background and prior 
employment) and Zoominfo.com, a search engine that specializes in collecting and 
indexing biographical and employment data from publicly available documents over the 
Web. We also use a variety of other sources on a case-by-case basis, including 
contacting the company to confirm the identity and the background of the board Hiring Cheerleaders — Page 9 
 
member. We use a conservative approach and only retain entries for which we can 
positively identify the board member as a former security analyst from multiple sources.   
We match our recommendation data to accounting and stock return data from 
CRSP/COMPUSTAT.  We also utilize data on firm-level governance measures, drawn 
from the IRRC database available through WRDS. 
Table I reports summary statistics for our sample. We can positively identify 51 
unique situations where analysts exiting the industry are later appointed to the board of 
directors of a firm that they themselves previously covered. Collectively these analysts 
cover a total of 1,163 firms issuing 4,130 recommendations between 1993 and 2006.  Our 
identification relies on the fact that these analysts cover a large number of stocks and 
produce numerous recommendations. Also, firms appointing former analysts to their 
board are covered by many other analysts: a total of 1,212 analysts making 4,716 
recommendations on these firms. We therefore exploit variation within and across 
analysts to identify systematic differences in recommendations.  Panels B, C, and D 
report board-, firm-, and analyst-level characteristics for our sample.  Panels B and C 
reveal that firms that appoint analysts to the board are slightly larger than other firms 
and have a slightly higher percentage of independent directors, but these differences are 
not statistically significant.  Panel D indicates that analysts who are appointed to the 
board tend to work for slightly larger brokerage houses and cover more stocks than 
other analysts, but again the differences are not significant. 
  Table II reports the distribution of our analyst appointments across industries 
The appointments are spread across a wide range of industries (29 of the Fama-French 
49 industries), with the two largest appointment shares coming from Finance and 
Trading (10%) and the Petroleum and Natural Gas industry (10%).  The total 
frequency (68) is greater than the total number of firm-appointments (51), as a number 
of the firms switch industry classifications throughout our sample period.  As we do 
analyses both pre- and post- appointment, we retain all industries that are represented.   
 
III.  Bias in Appointed Recommendations 
A. Distribution of recommendations 
The mere fact that analysts are subsequently appointed to boards of firms that Hiring Cheerleaders — Page 10 
 
they previously covered may not be unreasonable from a shareholder’s perspective. 
Analysts spend years (and in some cases their entire careers) covering a small set of 
stocks, and so may be expected to have relative expertise on these firms. They may be 
the types of informed agents that shareholders would like as representatives on the 
board of directors. However, motivations based solely on this expertise carry no 
prediction on the level of recommendations. Actions based on window-dressing motives 
by firms, in contrast, do. In this section we examine the stock recommendations of 
analysts on firms that subsequently appoint them to their board of directors.  
Table III presents the distribution of analysts’ recommendations and tests the 
hypothesis that analysts hired by the firm they formerly covered issued more optimistic 
recommendations on these firms. Panel A reports the distribution of recommendations 
issued by analysts on firms who subsequently appoint them to the board of directors 
(i.e., if analyst Jim Smith covers firm XYZ and he is later hired by XYZ to serve on the 
board, we report the distribution of his recommendations on XYZ in Panel A). We refer 
to these as “Appointed recommendations.”  
We compare this distribution to three benchmarks. Panel B reports the 
distribution of all other recommendations on the I/B/E/S tape. Panel C reports the 
distribution of recommendations by analysts who are not appointed to the board, on 
those same firms that do appoint an analyst to the board. (I.e. we report 
recommendations on XYZ by all other analysts, excluding the appointed analyst Jim 
Smith).  Panel D reports the distribution of recommendation by analysts who are 
appointed to the board, on all the stocks they cover excluding the firm who appoints 
them to the board.  (I.e. we report Jim Smith’s recommendations on all other firms he 
covered, excluding the appointing firm XYZ).  
 Comparing Panel A and Panel B reveals that appointed recommendations are 
significantly more optimistic than the I/B/E/S population. Roughly 42% of 
recommendations issued by analysts subsequently hired by the firm they cover are 
Strong Buy recommendations compared with only 25% for the whole sample. Similarly, 
over 82% of appointed recommendations are buys (Buy or Strong Buy), compared with 
only 57% of all of the non-appointed recommendations; we are able to safely reject the 
null hypothesis of no difference between the two distribution (Chi-square statistic=39.2, Hiring Cheerleaders — Page 11 
 
p-value<0.001). Panels C and D report very similar results in comparison to the 
Appointed recommendations of Panel A (Chi-square tests in both cases reject equal 
distributions with p-values<0.001).  To summarize, we find that analysts hired by the 
firm they previously covered issue significantly more optimistic recommendations on 
these firms relative to: 1) the universe of all sell side analysts, 2) recommendations on 
all other firms that they themselves issue, 3) recommendations on the appointing firm 
issued by all other analysts. 
 
B.  Regression results on the positive bias in board-appointed analyst recommendations  
In this section we run panel regressions on analyst recommendations to control 
for other determinants of recommendation levels. The dependent variable is the 
recommendation level of (1-5), which we reverse-score such that 1=Strong Sell, 2=Sell, 
3=Hold, 4=Buy, and 5=Strong Buy.
7 The key independent variable of interest is a 
categorical variable (Appointed Rec) that is equal to 1 if the recommendation is issued 
by an analyst who is subsequently appointed by the given firm as a board member, and 
0 otherwise.  A positive coefficient on this variable indicates that the appointed analyst 
issues more optimistic stock recommendations on the appointing firm relative to all 
other recommendations. 
  We include a number of firm-level controls: size, book-to-market, past 1-month, 
and past 1-year returns (from month t-12 to t-2). In addition, control variables for 
analyst and brokerage house include: two measure of analyst experience, the number of 
years an analyst has been issuing recommendations on I/B/E/S, and the number of 
years the analyst has been issuing recommendations on the given stock; an affiliation 
dummy, equal to one if the analyst is employed by a bank that has an underwriting 
relationship with the given firm; an All-Star dummy variable, equal to one if the analyst 
is listed as an "All-Star" in the October issue of Institutional Investor magazine in that 
year;
8 a measure of brokerage size, equal to the total number of analysts employed by 
the brokerage house, a measure of if the analyst shares an alumni connection with any 
                                                            
7 Note that on I/B/E/S, Strong Buys are coded equal to 1, and Strong Sells are coded equal to 5; we 
reverse this convention and set Strong Buys=5 and Strong Sell=1, and so on, such that increases in 
recommendation levels correspond to increases in optimism.  
8 The list of affiliated analysts and all-star analysts are from Ljungqvist at al. (2006, 2007). Hiring Cheerleaders — Page 12 
 
of the senior officers in the firm (CEO, CFO, or Chairman of the Board) (see Cohen, 
Frazzini, and Malloy (2010)); and fixed effects for recommendation month, analyst, 
firm, and industry, where indicated.
9  Standard errors are clustered at the 
recommendation month level.  
Table IV reports the regression results. Consistent with the results in Table III, 
in every specification the coefficient on Appointed Rec is positive and highly significant, 
indicating that the appointed recommendations are significantly more optimistic. The 
interpretation of the coefficient in the first column, equal to 0.48 (t=5.90), is that 
analysts’ recommendations are shifted half of a rating higher on firms that subsequently 
appoint them as board members; so while the mean rating is between a Buy and a Hold 
(3.74), the appointed analyst’s recommendation rises to between a Strong Buy and a 
Buy (4.22) on firms to which he is subsequently appointed. The appointment effect is 
largely unaffected by other firm-level, analyst-level, and brokerage-level controls. The 
effect does not seem to be driven by a certain time period of overly positive 
recommendations (month fixed-effects), by recommendations in a specific industry 
(industry fixed-effects), by something specific about analysts appointed to boards 
(analyst fixed-effects), or by something specific about the firms that appoint covering 
analysts to their boards (firm fixed-effects).
10  Finally, in the last column we run the 
same regression specification, but as an ordered logit, and find nearly identical results.
11     
To get an idea of the magnitude of the Appointed Rec effect, we compare it with 
a well-documented conflict of interest effect: underwriting affiliation of a given analyst’s 
investment bank with the firm in question (Lin and McNichols (1998), Lin, McNichols, 
and O’Brien (2005)). This literature shows that analysts have positively biased 
recommendations on these affiliated firms to which their investment banks do business. 
                                                            
9 We use a 48-industry classification from Ken French’s website. 
10 Given that we include fixed effects in all the regressions, constants are not reported.  We have also run 
all the tests in the paper clustering at the firm- or analyst-level. These results, which are very similar to 
those reported here, are available on request. For example, replicating the full specification of Table IV 
but adjusting the standard errors for clustering at the firm- (analyst-) level gives a t-stat on Appointed 
Rec of 2.57 (3.13), significant at the one-percent level.  We have also included firm age (which is highly 
correlated with size) in the regressions as a robustness check, and the results are virtually identical in 
terms of magnitude and significance. 
11 When the coefficients are transformed back into marginal effects, the predicted appointment effect is 
0.42.  We only report one set of coefficients, while the coefficients in an ordered logit can theoretically 
change for each increment of the dependent variable (1 to 2, 2 to 3, etc.).  We have checked this, 
especially for Appointed Rec, and the coefficient estimates are nearly identical across the increments. Hiring Cheerleaders — Page 13 
 
We include this affiliation effect in the regressions (Columns 2-9), and find that 
affiliation does have a positive effect on recommendations. However, it has no impact on 
the appointment effect (Appointed Rec), and the affiliation effect magnitude is 3 to 4 
times smaller than the appointment effect (0.11 to 0.14 vs. 0.36 to 0.44). 
In Columns 6-9, we include a dummy variable (Connected to Firm) that is equal 
to one if the analyst is connected to a senior officer through a school alumni link to 
control for the possibility that social ties may be driving the bias in recommendations 
that we observe for appointed analysts.  The coefficient on Appointed Rec is virtually 
unchanged, while the coefficient on Connected to Firm is small and insignificant.
12   
We also break up our sample and examine our main result both before and after 
Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD).  Columns 7 and 8 show that the coefficient on 
Appointed Rec is very similar both before and after Reg FD, suggesting that changes in 
the information environment that may have accompanied the imposition of this law had 
virtually no impact on the appointment effect that we document here. 
 
IV.  Performance of Appointed Analysts 
A. Performance on the appointing firm 
In this section we explore appointed analyst predictive ability.  Under the 
hypothesis that analysts are selected to serve on the board on the basis of their 
perceived ability, potential efficacy, and general understanding of the appointing firm, 
one might expect that appointed analysts would demonstrate higher predictive ability 
on their stock recommendations on the appointing firm.  We run a variety of tests to 
examine this conjecture.   
First, we run panel regressions where the dependent variable is a dummy variable 
(Wrong Bet) equal to one if the return in the year immediately following the analyst’s 
recommendation is the opposite sign from that implied by the recommendation.  For 
example, if the subsequent annual stock return is negative (positive) and the 
recommendation is a strong buy or buy (strong sell or sell), then the variable Wrong 
                                                            
12 Cohen et al. (2010) find, as we do here, that the social ties have no effect on recommendation levels.  
Note that we are only able to match 20% of analysts’ education data (roughly 80,000 recommendations 
versus the full sample of 400,000).  Our power is thus slightly reduced in Columns 6-9 where connections 
are included, which explains the slightly smaller (though still significant) t-stats. Hiring Cheerleaders — Page 14 
 
Bet is set equal to one.
13  On the right-hand side of these regressions we control for 
known determinants of stock returns such as size, book-to-market, past 1-month, and 
past 1-year returns (from month t-12 to t-2), as well as the complete set of analyst-level 
controls used in Table IV. 
The first three columns of Table V indicate that appointed analysts’ 
recommendations on appointing firms are incorrect significantly more often than the 
typical analyst recommendation.  For example, the coefficient on Appointed Rec in 
Column 3 of 0.154 (t=2.67) is positive and highly significant.  As the mean for Wrong 
Bet across all analyst recommendations is approximately 26%, the coefficient on 
Appointed Rec here of indicates that appointed analysts’ calls on appointed firms are 
around 50% more likely to be incorrect than the typical analyst recommendation, 
controlling for firm- and analyst-level characteristics (15.4%/26%). 
We also employ a similar set of tests for changes in recommendations.  The 
changes we examine are upgrades from the consensus recommendation (Upgrade), and 
downgrades from the consensus recommendation (Downgrade).  Here, Wrong Bet is 
defined such that if the subsequent annual stock return is negative (positive) and the 
recommendation is an upgrade (downgrade), then the variable Wrong Bet is set equal to 
one.  Once again, the last three columns of Table V indicate that appointed analysts’ 
upgrades and downgrades on appointing firms are wrong bets significantly more often 
than the typical recommendation change.
14  In Column 6, for instance, while the mean 
for Wrong Bet across all analyst recommendation changes is approximately 18%, the 
coefficient on Appointed Rec here (0.165, t=3.11) indicates that appointed analysts’ 
calls on appointed firms are around 90% more likely to be incorrect than the typical 
analyst recommendation change (16.5%/18%). 
                                                            
13 We have also run these regressions where Wrong Bet is defined relative to positive and negative 4-
factor alphas, rather than returns.  For example, if an analyst recommends a strong buy and the stock 
experiences a negative alpha over the next year, then Wrong Bet w o u l d  b e  e q u a l  t o  o n e .   N o t  
surprisingly, since we already control for the known determinants of returns on the right-hand side of 
these regressions, the results using alphas are virtually identical to those reported here; for example, the 
coefficient on Wrong Bet using alphas as the threshold variable in Table V column 1 is 0.183 (t=3.46). 
14 Since appointed analysts issue very few holds, sells, and downgrades, the results here in Table V are 
driven largely by the large number of incorrect calls on buys and upgrades by appointed analysts;   
restricting our definition of Wrong Bet to include only the performance on buys and upgrades yields very 
similar results. We document a similar finding in Table VI below that appointed analyst 
underperformance is concentrated in buys/upgrades on appointing firms when we explore the magnitude 
of the returns following appointed recommendations. Hiring Cheerleaders — Page 15 
 
We then run another set of panel regressions where the dependent variable is the 
actual return to the recommendation in the year immediately following a 
recommendation, rather than the dummy variables designed to capture right or wrong 
bets used in Table V.  The key variable of interest is an interaction term Appointed 
Rec*Upgrade (Appointed Rec*Downgrade), which equals 1 if the analyst recommending 
the stock in question is subsequently appointed to the board of directors of that firm, 
and the recommendation in question is an upgrade (downgrade) from consensus.
15 
Dummy variables for Appointed Rec and Upgrade (Downgrade) are also included.  The 
rest of the independent variables are the same as those used in Table IV.  Again, by 
controlling for firm size, book-to-market, and past year returns on the right-hand side, 
we control for the well-known determinants of firm-level expected returns.   
Consistent with the prior results on wrong bets, Table VI indicates that 
appointed analysts exhibit poor performance on their recommendations on appointing 
firms.  For example, the negative and significant coefficient on the interaction term in 
Column 1 (-19.5%, t=2.35) implies that appointed analysts do much worse on their 
upgrades on appointed firms than on the rest of their recommendations.  Further, 
Column 1 also shows that while the typical analyst upgrade earns 9.4% in the 
subsequent year, suggesting that upgrades in general are informative about future 
returns, appointing analysts’ upgrades on appointing firms earn only an insignificant 
3.1% (=-19.5%+9.4%+13.3%, F-test=0.67).  Also, the fact that appointed analysts’ 
upgrades perform significantly worse than the rest of their recommendations on these 
firms (which earn between 10.6% to 13.3%) is particularly surprising, since upgrades 
from consensus are presumably a bullish indicator, while the rest of these 
recommendations consist of agreements with consensus and downgrades from consensus.  
Columns 4-6 reveal no significant differences between appointed analysts’ downgrades 
on appointing firms and the rest of their recommendations; the interaction term 
Appointed Rec*Downgrade is always insignificant, and is not consistent in sign.
16  
                                                            
15 We have experimented with different definitions of upgrades and downgrades, e.g. upgrades from an 
analyst’s last recommendation rather than upgrades from consensus, and the results are similar to those 
reported here.  We prefer changes from consensus, as consensus is a measure of industry-aggregated 
information sets of analysts covering the firm that are currently revealed to the market.  
16The coefficient on Downgrade suggests that the typical analyst downgrade is uninformative for future 
returns.  Untabulated statistics indicate that the typical analysts’ downgrades are weakly informative at Hiring Cheerleaders — Page 16 
 
Importantly, for both upgrades and downgrades, we find no evidence that appointed 
analysts exhibit superior performance on their recommendations of appointing firms. 
Overall, whether we look at the number of incorrect calls, whether we look at 
recommendation levels or changes, or whether we look at the actual returns earned 
following these recommendations, we find a similar pattern of relative underperformance 
by appointed analysts on the firms that appoint them.  In fact, we cannot find anything 
in the track records of appointed analysts to suggest that these analysts would be 
particularly effective monitors of the firms that appoint them.  
 
B.  Overall performance of appointed analysts 
  One argument that could be made in response to the results above is that 
perhaps analysts are selected to serve on the board on the basis of their overall 
perceived ability, and not necessarily on their stock return performance on a single firm.  
Under this hypothesis, one might expect these analysts to outperform other analysts in 
a more general sense.  To explore this idea, we examine the overall earnings forecasting 
ability
17 and the overall stock return forecasting ability of appointed analysts. 
  Our first tests examine overall earnings forecasting ability. From the point of 
view of a firm hiring an analyst to serve on its board, the predictions in terms of analyst 
ability would seemingly apply to earnings forecasting ability as well as stock return 
forecasting ability.  To conduct these tests, we compute the identical score measure used 
in Hong and Kubik (2003) in order to rank analysts across all the firms they cover in a 
given year.  Specifically, we rank each analyst on each firm based on their absolute 
forecast error, computed as the absolute difference between her forecast for firm j in 
year t and the actual EPS of the firm, scaled by the stock price.  For each analyst, we 
choose her most recent earnings per share forecast of year-end earnings issued by 
analyst i on firm j between January 1st and July 1st of year t.  As in Hong and Kubik 
(2003), we then transform these rankings into a score measure (Score_EPS) where an 
analyst with a rank of one in terms of the lowest absolute forecast error receives a 100, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
shorter horizons.  However, irrespective of horizon, we find no evidence that appointed analysts’ 
downgrades (or upgrades) on appointing firms are informative for future returns.  
17We examine the earnings forecasts of appointed analysts specifically on the firms that subsequently 
appoint them to the boards of directors further in Section VII. Hiring Cheerleaders — Page 17 
 
while the least accurate analyst receives a score of 0; the median and mean score for a 
firm in a year is 50.
18  This relative measure of earnings forecasting ability allows us to 
compare all analysts, regardless of coverage, on the same scale.  We take the average of 
this score measure across all the firms an analyst covers in a given year.
19  We then run 
panel regressions of these annual analyst-level score measures on the same set of control 
variables used in Tables IV-VI, except that these control variables are now averaged 
across all firms that an analyst covers in a given year.  Thus, observations are at the 
analyst-year level.
20   
  The first three columns of Table VII present the results from these tests.  The 
coefficient on Appointed Analyst is strongly negative, indicating that appointed analysts 
perform worse overall on their earnings forecasts, across all the firms they cover, than 
other analysts.  The mean of the left-hand side variable equals 50 by construction, so 
the magnitude of the coefficients in Column 1-3 implies that appointed analysts’ earn a 
ranking that is approximately 7-11% worse than the average analyst ranking.  Column 
1’s coefficient on Appointed Analyst of -5.63 (t=4.16), for instance, implies that 
appointed analysts earn an over 11% worse ranking than the average analyst.      
  We adopt a similar analyst-level ranking procedure in order to compare the 
overall stock return forecasting ability of appointed analysts.  To do so, we compute the 
variable Wrong Bet as in Table V for each recommendation for each analyst;  in these 
tests Wrong Bet is set equal to one if the recommendation is an upgrade (downgrade) 
and the subsequent year’s stock-level four-factor alpha is negative (positive).  We then 
sum across each analyst for each year to compute each analyst’s proportion of incorrect 
calls in a given year; we then rank analysts inversely by this proportion, and then 
transform these rankings into a score measure (Score_Rec) similar to the one described 
above.  This variable Score_Rec again varies between 0 and 100, where the most 
accurate analyst (i.e., with a rank of 1 in terms of the lowest proportion of incorrect 
                                                            
18 As in Hong and Kubik (2003), we compute this measure as: SCOREi,j,t=100 - [(Rank-1)/(Number of 
Analystsj,t - 1)]*100.  
19 Results are not sensitive to using multiple-year averages to compute annual analyst-level score 
measures. 
20 As we are now collapsing and evaluating at the analyst level, our Appointed Analyst variable will not 
change for a given analyst over time (the analyst either is, or is not, subsequently appointed to a board), 
so we cannot include analyst fixed effects (nor firm fixed effects, as everything is collapsed to the analyst 
level).  We can, and do, include year fixed effects in the regressions (Time) and all standard errors are 
adjusted for clustering at the ranking year level.  Hiring Cheerleaders — Page 18 
 
calls) receives a score of 100, and the least accurate analyst receives a score of 0; the 
median and mean score for a firm in a year is 50.  
  The last three columns of Table VII present the results from these tests.  The 
coefficient on Appointed Analyst is again strongly negative, indicating that appointed 
analysts also perform worse overall on their entire set of recommendations relative to 
other analysts.  The magnitude of the coefficient is similar to the coefficient on the 
earnings rankings, again implying that appointed analysts earn a ranking that is about 
6-11% lower than the average analyst ranking.  The Column 4 coefficient on Appointed 
Analyst of -5.28 (t=3.81) implies that appointed analysts earn a recommendation 
ranking over 10% worse than the average analyst.  
  Taken together, the findings in Tables V-VII indicate that appointed analysts are 
not only poor relative performers on their stock recommendations on appointing firms, 
but are also poor relative performers in a much broader sense as well.  Specifically, 
appointed analysts perform poorly on both their earnings forecasts and their stock 
recommendations, across the entire portfolio of firms that they cover.  
 
V.  The Timing of Positive Recommendations 
    In this section we examine the dynamics of appointed analysts’ recommendations. 
Specifically, we identify situations where firms may find a positive recommendation 
especially advantageous, and examine the behavior of the appointed analysts versus all 
other analysts at these times. The three situations we examine are: i.) periods preceding 
large amounts of stock issuance by the firm, ii.) periods following especially high short 
interest in the firm, and iii.) periods where the last analyst’s recommendation 
downgraded the stock from the consensus. 
To examine the first two scenarios, we use the same framework as in Table IV: 
the dependent variable is the level of recommendation, and as before the variable 
Appointed Rec measures the recommendations of analysts on the firms that 
subsequently appoint them to the board. All of the control variables from Table IV are 
included (but unreported) in Table VIII. In addition to these variables we include the 
following dummy variables: Last Rec. Downgrade, which equals 1 when the prior 
recommendation by the last analyst was a downgrade from consensus; High Short Hiring Cheerleaders — Page 19 
 
Interest, which equals 1 if the firm had above median short interest level in the month 
prior to the recommendation being issued; and High Future Issuance, which is equal to 
1 if the firm has above median stock issuance in the 6 months following the 
recommendation. The results are in Columns 1-3 of Table VIII. From Column 1, the 
average analyst’s recommendation is significantly more negative following times of high 
short interest (i.e., the coefficient on high short interest is negative and significant). 
However, Column 2 shows that analysts who are subsequently appointed to boards of 
the firms they cover have the complete opposite behavior and issue significantly more 
positive recommendations following months of high short interest on these firms. From 
Column 3, these same analysts also issue especially positive forecasts when the 
appointing firm has a large amount of stock issuance in the near future.  Specifically, 
the coefficients on [High Short*Appointed Rec] of 0.326 (t=2.14) and on [High 
Issue*Appointed Rec] of 0.303 (t=2.19) imply that the appointed analysts issue 
recommendations roughly twice as upwardly biased at these times.  
To test the effect following a downgrade by another analyst, we use a slightly 
different specification. In Columns 4 and 5, the dependent variable is a categorical 
variable equal to 1 if the given recommendation is a downgrade from the current 
consensus estimate. While the average analyst downgrades 42% of the time, the 
coefficient on Appointed Rec in Column 4 of -0.17 (t=3.06) indicates that appointed 
analysts downgrade only 25% of the time, or about 40% less often (17%/42%) on firms 
to which they are subsequently appointed to the board.  In Column 5, we see that 
consistent with prior findings on analyst herding, the average analyst is about 7% more 
likely to downgrade from consensus if the prior analyst downgraded. Analysts later 
appointed to boards again do the exact opposite: they are especially unlikely to 
downgrade the firms they are appointed to at exactly those times when the last analyst 
downgraded from the consensus.  To get an idea of the magnitude of the difference in 
behavior, when the prior recommendation was a downgrade, the average analyst will 
downgrade roughly 49% of the time (42%+7%), while analysts later appointed to the 
boards of firms will only downgrade these appointing firms roughly 21% of the time 
(42%+7%-2%-26%), making them roughly 60% less likely to downgrade.  
All of these tests point to the same types of behaviors: not only do analysts who Hiring Cheerleaders — Page 20 
 
are subsequently appointed to boards of firms they cover have significantly more 
positive recommendations, but they have especially large positive biases at precisely 
those times likely to be most valuable to these firms.   
 
VI.    The Post-Appointment Behavior and Performance of Appointing Firms 
 
  In this section we explore the impact of appointing a former analyst to the board.  
We focus on the behavior and performance of appointing firms in the period after the 
appointment of a former analyst.
21    
A. Behavior and Performance of Appointing Firms in the Post-Appointment Period 
  As noted earlier, appointing overly bullish analysts need not imply bad 
monitoring. It is possible that optimistic directors might facilitate productive 
cooperation and communication among board members, or have ideas on new strategies 
and directions for growth.  On the other hand, if firms are simply hiring cheerleaders for 
the current management and board, we might expect these firms to engage in more 
potentially questionable activities for shareholders once having the cheerleader on the 
board. One of these questionable behaviors that is both well documented and 
established in the literature is earnings management.  Specifically, we focus on the 
portion of earnings management that is discretionary, and that has been shown to have 
a positive short-term impact on a firm’s stock price: discretionary accruals (Sloan 
(1996)).   
  In this section we use the actual appointment dates (given in Table II) to 
identify changes in behavior and valuation implications.
22 We present the results from 
regressions that test whether firms change their behavior after appointing their former 
analyst in Panel A of Table IX.  Specifically, we regress a firm’s discretionary accruals
23 
                                                            
21 We have also examined the characteristics of appointing firms, and find that appointing firms have 
significantly weaker governance, as measured by the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) index (e.g., 
regressions of the GIndex on Appointing Firm yield a positive and significant on Appointing Firm 
(=0.284, t=4.05)).  These results are available on request.   
22 In the next section we address the endogeneity of these appointment dates using an instrument for 
appointment dates. 
23 Discretionary accruals are computed using the modified Jones model described in Dechow, Sloan, and 
Sweeney (1995), and are equal to the residuals from firm-level regressions of total accruals on non-
discretionary accruals (where non-discretionary accruals are equal to the change in sales minus the change Hiring Cheerleaders — Page 21 
 
on After Appointment, a categorical variable equal to 1 if the former analyst is a board 
director, and zero otherwise.  In these tests, we include only those firms that do appoint 
analysts as board members to isolate the pre- and post-appointment effect on their 
behavior (a total of 402 firm-year observations).  In addition, we include year fixed 
effects and firm fixed effects, as we want to capture solely the marginal effect of having 
the former analyst on the board, within a given firm, and controlling for sample time 
trends.  We also include a number of firm-level control variables, which given the firm 
and year fixed effects, can be interpreted as the effect of these variables after firm 
averages and time period trends have been removed.  The most important control 
variable is Total Accruals.
24  With total accruals included, the coefficient on After 
Appointment can be interpreted as follows: given the same level of actual accruals 
before and after appointment, how much more of the accruals are discretionary 
(earnings management) after the appointment.   
  The positive and significant coefficient on After Appointment (=0.022, t=2.06) in 
Column 1 implies that firms have significantly higher discretionary accruals (do 
significantly more earnings management), once the former analyst joins the board.  To 
get an idea of magnitude, the unconditional average of accruals in the sample is -0.01 
(with a median of 0), while 0.022 represents a move to the 75th percentile, so the entire 
upper-quartile spread.  Controlling for the level of Total Accruals has no effect on the 
magnitude or significance of After Appointment (Column 3).  In the model including all 
controls (even current year’s earnings level), the estimated change in behavior even 
increases in point-estimate and significance level, with After Appointment having a 
coefficient of 0.030 (t=2.51).          
We also compute value-weighted calendar-time portfolio returns in order to 
assess the post-appointment performance of our sample of appointing firms.  Our goal is 
to assess the valuation implications associated with the observed appointment and 
potential behavior changes.  It could as easily be a signal of a firm characteristic that 
causes both the appointment of a former analyst and poor subsequent performance (e.g. 
poor governance).  This endogeneity will be directly addressed in the next section.  In 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
in receivables plus gross property, plant, and equipment, all scaled by last year’s total assets); each firm 
must have a minimum of ten years of data to be included in these regressions   
24 Total Accruals are the total annual amount of accruals of the firm, calculated as in Healy (1985). Hiring Cheerleaders — Page 22 
 
either case, though, the action of appointing a former analyst (who was optimistic and a 
poor relative performer) to the firm’s board of directors may be informative about the 
future of the firm itself.  To perform our analysis we construct two portfolios (After 
Appointment and Non-Appointment), as well as for a spread portfolio (Spread) which 
goes long the After Appointment portfolio and short the Non-Appointment portfolio 
each month. Firms that appoint analysts to the board enter the After Appointment 
portfolio in the month following their appointment, and remain in the portfolio for a 
year; all other stocks are placed in the Non-Appointment portfolio.  Each month we 
compute the value-weighted return on each portfolio.  We require the After 
Appointment portfolio to contain at least 3 stocks in any given month, and thus use a 
sample period of February 1997 to December 2006.  We also compute 3-factor (Fama 
and French (1996), 4-factor (Carhart (1997), and 5-factor (Pastor and Stambaugh 
(2003)) alphas on each of the portfolios.   
Panel B of Table IX presents the average monthly value-weighted calendar-time 
portfolio returns on all three portfolios.  Panel B illustrates that the magnitude of 
underperformance by appointing firms is large: the Spread portfolio earns -1.3% per 
month in raw returns, and up to almost -2.0% per month in abnormal returns; the 3- 
and 5-factor specifications are significant at the 5% level, while the raw and 4-factor 
specifications are significant at the 10% level.  The entire spread in abnormal returns 
between the two portfolios is due to the underperformance of the After Appointment 
portfolio, as the Non-Appointment portfolio earns alphas of almost exactly zero.  Thus, 
the post-appointment performance of our sample of appointing firms is poor.           
 
B.  Instrumental Variables Regressions 
  To overcome the potential endogeneity of analyst board appointments, and 
specifically the possibility that poor anticipated performance might lead to analyst 
appointments (and that increases in earnings management might reflect efforts to 
mitigate poor stock price performance that would have occurred whether the analyst 
appointment took place or not), we also instrument for the appointment of a cheerleader 
analyst.  To be clear, the regressions in Panel A of Table IX on firm behavior include Hiring Cheerleaders — Page 23 
 
only firms that appoint analysts, and examine the changes in behavior of solely these 
firms pre- and post-appointment.  Thus, the only way that an endogeneity concern 
could be driving the effects we document there is through a pure timing explanation.  In 
other words, a firm could decide to appoint a former friendly analyst to the board at 
precisely the time when it foresees a future deterioration in performance and future need 
for earnings management.  In this interpretation, the change in earnings management 
behavior we document is concurrent with, but not a result of, the analyst’s 
appointment.  As this explanation is plausible, in this section we specifically instrument 
for the timing of analyst board member appointments to get around the potential 
endogeneity problems regarding the interpretation of the changes in firm behavior in 
Table IX Panel A.    
  We do so by exploiting the post-Global Settlement time period when analysts 
were widely scrutinized and scorned and hence in low demand to serve as potential 
directors.  We use this exogenous shock to the desirability/availability of analysts in the 
pool of potential directors as an instrument for the actual appointment of cheerleader 
analysts.
25  This shock involved penalties for conflicts of interest stemming from several 
brokerage houses’ relationships with, and behavior toward, investment banking clients, 
and is thus plausibly exogenous to any given firm’s accounting reporting decision 
regarding discretionary accrual behavior. 
  Our first-stage regression, shown in Column 1 of Panel A Table X, is a regression 
of actual analyst appointment months on a categorical variable Post-Global Settlement 
that is equal to 1 for those firm-months after the Global Settlement (April 2003-April 
2005) and zero otherwise, plus the same control variables used in Table IX.  We run 
this predictive regression in the symmetric four year-window pre- and post-Global 
Settlement (so April 2001 - April 2005).
26  Column 1 confirms that this post-Global 
Settlement variable is a negative and significant predictor of analyst appointment dates 
(-0.014, (t=2.57)).  Note that this regression, like those in Panel A of Table IX, uses 
                                                            
25 See Guner, Malmendier and Tate (2008) for a similar instrumental variables approach that uses the 
banking crisis in the late 1970s and early 1980s to identify times when commercial bankers were perceived 
to be less suitable candidates for corporate board directorships.  
26 We have experimented with this window, using six-, eight-, and ten-year windows around the Global 
Settlement, and the results are very similar in significance, with slightly smaller, but similar magnitudes.  
These results are available on request.  We choose to show the four-year window as it isolates the tightest 
band of negative sentiment around the Global Settlement. Hiring Cheerleaders — Page 24 
 
only those firms that appoint an analyst as a board member, since the potential 
endogeneity problem, as described above, concerns the timing of cheerleader 
appointment; we do address firm selection issues below in a matched sample framework.  
We use the predicted values of this first-stage regression as estimates of the probability 
that a firm will appoint a cheerleader in any given month; for each firm we then take 
the firm-month with the highest predicted probability of appointment, and use this as 
our instrumented appointment date.  We then define the variable Instrumented After 
Appointment as a categorical variable equal to 1 for all firm-years after the firm has its 
highest predicted probability of appointment, and 0 otherwise.  
  We use these instrumented appointments to examine the pre- and post-
appointment effect on firm behavior, as in Table IX.  Specifically, the second stage 
regression in Column 2 of Panel A Table X is a regression of discretionary accruals on 
the variable Instrumented After Appointment plus the same control variables used in 
Column 1.  Column 2 shows that instrumented appointments are positive and 
significant predictors of increases in discretionary accruals.  From Column 2, the 
positive and significant coefficient of 0.018 (t=2.71) implies that firms have significantly 
higher discretionary accruals (do significantly more earnings management), once a 
former analyst is predicted to join the board.  This instrumented coefficient is similar in 
magnitude, and more precisely estimated than that in Table IX.     
  As a falsification test for our instrumentation technique, we look at the exact 
same instrumented analyst board appointments, but instead examine their impact on 
non-discretionary accruals.  Non-discretionary accruals are the portion of accruals that 
firms have no ability to manipulate to create a better reflection of current earnings.  
Thus, the appointment of an analyst should have no impact on the discretionary 
accruals of a firm.  If, in contrast, our instrumented analyst appointments are simply 
picking up a spurious relationship with firm accruals, we would expect to see this 
exhibited in both the discretionary and non-discretionary portions.  We therefore run 
the exact same regression as in Column 2, but with the dependent variable now being 
non-discretionary accruals. In contrast to discretionary accruals (earnings management), 
Column 3 illustrates that instrumented appointments do not predict any increases in 
non-discretionary accruals. Hiring Cheerleaders — Page 25 
 
 
C.  Matched Sample Approach 
  To address the possibility that the particular types of firms that choose to 
appoint former analysts may be the types of firms that would engage in earnings 
management regardless of whether or not they appointed a former analyst, we also 
employ a matched sample approach.  We construct our matched sample by matching 
appointing firms to other firms that in the year leading up to the appointments were: i.) 
in the same Fama-French 49 industry category, ii.) in the same size quintile, iii.) in the 
same book-to-market quintile, and iv.) in the same discretionary accruals quintile as the 
appointing firms; but who did not appoint a cheerleader in the year of a cheerleader 
appointment.  Note that these tests are designed to examine the composition of firms 
appointing cheerleader analysts, as opposed to the timing of when appointing firms 
choose to appoint cheerleader analysts (which we examined in our IV tests above).   
  Column 4 of Table X repeats the same result shown in Column 6 of Panel A 
Table IX, which regresses discretionary accruals on the After Appointment variable 
described in Table IX for the sample of appointing firms.  Column 5 of Table X runs the 
identical regression, but this time on our matched sample of non-appointing firms 
designed to mimic the characteristics of the appointing firms.  Unlike the appointing 
firms, which engage in significantly more earnings management post-appointment, the 
matched firms with similar characteristics (including engaging in the same level of 
earnings management in the period pre-appointment) exhibit no change in their 
earnings management following these cheerleader appointments.
27   
        
                                                            
27 This result is robust to variations in the way we construct our matching sample.  For example, 
matching in addition on prior stock return performance gives the same result. Hiring Cheerleaders — Page 26 
 
VII.  Discussion 
  In this section we discuss the interpretation of our results in greater depth.  In 
particular we focus on the distinction between optimism in general versus sympathy 
towards management, as well as the interplay between the supply and demand for 
biased analysts.   
 
A. Optimism Versus Sympathy Towards Management 
  From a shareholder perspective, there is an important distinction between purely 
optimistic analysts versus those analysts that are specifically sympathetic (cheerleaders) 
to management, in terms of ability to perform their duty of monitoring management.  
Most of our evidence on analyst recommendations to this point is consistent with both 
possibilities (although the opportunistic timing of especially positive recommendations 
from Table VIII appears less supportive of unconditional optimism, and more supportive 
of an analyst sympathetic toward management).  In addition, our IV evidence on 
increased earnings management behavior following appointment appears more consistent 
with a cheerleader for management.  We provide two additional tests to help further 
distinguish between exactly which explanation (optimism toward firm vs. cheerleader 
toward management) better describes our appointed analysts. 
  The first test has to do with optimism in earnings forecasts.  If the analyst were 
simply optimistic about the future prospects of the firm, we would expect to see this 
expressed in both positive views in recommendations and earnings forecasts.  Contrast 
this with an analyst who is a cheerleader for management.  Here we would expect to 
observe positively biased recommendations as these clearly benefit the firm (Womack 
(1996)).  By contrast, the direction of the cheerleader’s bias is much less clear with 
respect to earnings forecasts.  There is some positive effect at the time of increasing a 
consensus estimate, however this effect is likely mitigated by the negative effect of 
making it more difficult for the firm to beat earnings consensus at the time of earnings 
announcement.  Consistent with this conjecture, in unreported tests we find no evidence 
of appointed analyst optimism on one- and two-year earnings forecasts.
28  The fact that 
                                                            
28 For example, when we employ regressions using the identical specification as in Table IV, but replacing 
the dependent variable with one-year earnings forecast optimism (measured as: (forecast-actual)/actual), Hiring Cheerleaders — Page 27 
 
we find little evidence of optimism in the earnings forecasts of appointed analysts helps 
to rule out the possibility that appointed analysts are simply optimistic about firm 
prospects, as opposed to behaving in a specific way that benefits the managers of the 
firm (i.e., sympathetic to management).   
  We provide additional evidence on this distinction between being optimistic per 
se versus being sympathetic towards management by exploring post-appointment CEO 
compensation.  For example, analysts who are purely optimistic about a firm’s prospects 
may be especially hard on managers who fail to operate the business at a level that 
meets analysts’ expectations (note the poor post-appointment performance in Table IX).  
In contrast, cheerleaders for management are, by definition, beholden to the managers of 
the firm.  Using the instrumental variables framework described in Section VI above, we 
test the idea that boards with former analysts behave differently towards the CEO in 
the post-appointment period.  Specifically, Panel B of Table X repeats the instrumental 
variable regressions in Columns 1 and 2 of Panel A, except that the control variable for 
total accruals is removed in both stages, and the dependent variable in the second-stage 
regression in Column 2 is now total CEO compensation (the variable TDC2 as reported 
in the ExecuComp Database).  Column 2 indicates that firms increase CEO 
compensation post-appointment of a former cheerleader analyst.  The coefficient of 4554 
(t=1.85), represents an increase of roughly one-third of a standard deviation in total 
compensation. 
 
B.  Supply and Demand for Biased Analysts 
  On the firm side, the question remains as to why firms choose to appoint these 
particular analysts to serve on their board of directors.  Even if the only willing supply 
consists of these biased, relatively poor-performing analysts, the firms are still making 
an active decision to appoint them.  Thus while it is true that an optimistic analyst may 
simply be more likely to accept a board seat than an otherwise similar analyst, our 
results imply that firms are either appointing the wrong analysts, or that firms should 
simply demand zero analysts if the only willing supply consists of biased analysts.  One 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
the coefficient on Appointing Forecast is nearly zero, 0.005 (t=0.13).   Hiring Cheerleaders — Page 28 
 
might still argue that even a biased (and poor performing) analyst may be better than 
the next best alternative director for the firm.  However, our IV results on the increased 
levels of earnings management, our results on the poor performance following the former 
analyst appointment, and the fact that these appointments are concentrated in 
significantly more poorly governed firms suggest that the board appointments of the 
former analysts are not incredibly effective monitoring choices from the view of 
shareholder interests.    
  On the analyst side, a similar question arises as to why analysts would want to 
bias their recommendations given their incentives to produce accurate forecasts (see 
Stickel (1992) and Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (1999)).  In this case, the poor overall 
relative performance of these appointed analysts suggests that these analysts are 
unlikely to reap the rewards of good performance, and hence the cost of biasing 
recommendations on a single firm is quite low.   
 
VIII.  Conclusion 
 
  This paper provides evidence that firms appoint independent directors who are 
overly sympathetic to management, while still technically independent according to 
regulatory definitions.  We do so by exploiting a unique, hand-collected database of 
former sell-side analysts who are appointed to the boards of companies they previously 
covered; importantly, our data provides us with information on these directors’ views 
regarding the firm prior to being appointed to the board.  Our empirical strategy thus 
allows us to directly evaluate the objectivity and potential effectiveness of a class of 
independent directors based solely on their observable opinions about the firm in 
question.  We use these analysts’ track records to examine the roles of optimism and 
ability in the board appointment process.  In doing so we find evidence that boards 
appoint overly optimistic analysts (i.e., cheerleaders for management) who exhibit little 
skill in evaluating the firm itself, or in evaluating firms in general.  While the literature 
has explored measures of director relationships, this paper is the first to empirically 
document this phenomenon of firms actively appointing board cheerleaders.  Hiring Cheerleaders — Page 29 
 
  The magnitude of the optimistic bias is large: 82.0% of appointed 
recommendations are strong-buy/buy recommendations, compared to 56.9% for all other 
analyst recommendations.  At the same time, board-appointed analysts exhibit poor 
relative performance on their recommendations on appointing firms.  They also 
demonstrate poor overall relative performance on their stock recommendations and 
earnings forecasts across all the firms that they cover.  Additionally, these appointed 
analysts appear to be especially optimistic at times that are most favorable to the 
appointing firms (e.g., prior to stock issuances).  Lastly, we examine the behavior and 
stock return performance of these appointing firms following the analyst’s appointment, 
and find that appointing firms significantly increase their earnings management 
activities, increase CEO compensation, and perform poorly in the post-appointment 
period.      
  We believe that our results, when taken as a whole, shed new light on the views 
and characteristics of independent directors, and of the firms who appoint them. 
Further, the post-appointment behavior of the appointing firms in our sample suggest 
that exploring the past track records and backgrounds of all board members (beyond 
simply independent vs. inside) may be a useful way to identify cross-sectional variation 
in firm governance quality. Before the question of whether independent boards benefit 
shareholders can be adequately addressed, more research is needed to determine the true 
nature of "independence" within corporate boards, which begins with an understanding 
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This table shows summary statistics for the sample of sell side analysts and their covered stocks between 1993 and 2006.  
Panel A reports the composition of the sample.  Panels B and C report board and firm-level characteristics for the 
sample of firms that subsequently appoint an analyst who used to cover them to the board of directors, and for the 
sample of all other firms ("Others").  Panel D reports analyst characteristics for the sample of analysts who are 
appointed to the board of a firm they previously covered, and for the sample of all other analysts ("Others").     
Brokerage Size is the total number of analysts issuing recommendations at the given analyst's brokerage house. 
Experience measures an analyst’s history of recommending stocks on I/B/E/S at the time of the recommendation, in 
years.  
 
Panel A: Sample Composition   
Number of firms covered by appointed analysts  1,163 
Number of firms appointing analysts to the board 51 
Number of analysts covering appointing firms 1,212 
Panel B: Board Characteristics  Sample of firms appointing 
an analyst to their board 
Others
    
Average size of board  6.34 6.55
Percentage of independent directors on board 0.57 0.49
   
Panel C: Firm Characteristics  Sample of firms appointing 
an analyst to their board 
Others
 
Number of recommendations  4,716  416,226
Market value of equity percentile  0.83   0.78 
Book-to-market percentile  0.34   0.39 
12-month prior return percentile  0.56   0.54 
Number of analysts covering stock  10.81 
 
9.27
Panel D: Analyst Characteristics  Sample of analysts 
appointed to board of firm 
they previously covered 
Others
 
Number of stocks covered  16.9  12.6
Brokerage size  60.4 57.5
Experience in years  4.4 4.3
   





 Table II: Firm and Analyst Board Appointments 
This table shows the industry distribution of the firms that appoint their former sell side analysts to their 
board of directors.  The total num b e r  i s  g r e a t e r  t h a n  5 1  a s  a  n u m ber of the firms switch industry 
classifications over the 14 year sample.   
   
Industry Distribution
Industry Frequency Percent 
Automobiles and Trucks  1 1.47 
Banking 3 4.41 
Business Services  6 8.82 
Chemicals 2 2.94 
Computer Software  3 4.41 
Construction Materials  1 1.47 
Electrical Equipment  1 1.47 
Electronic Equipment  1 1.47 
Entertainment and Theatre 3 4.41 
Finance and Trading  7 10.29 
Food Products  2 2.94 
Healthcare Services  1 1.47 
Household and Consumer Goods 2 2.94 
Insurance 1 1.47 
Iron and Steel Works  2 2.94 
Machinery 5 7.35 
Measuring and Control (Laboratory) Equipment 2 2.94 
Medical Equipment  1 1.47 
Non-Metallic and Industrial Metal Mining 1 1.47 
Petroleum and Natural Gas 7 10.29 
Pharmaceutical Products  2 2.94 
Precious Metals  1 1.47 
Printing and Publishing  1 1.47 
Recreation and Toys  1 1.47 
Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 2 2.94 
Retail 3 4.41 
Transportation 1 1.47 
Utilities 1 1.47 
Wholesale 4 5.88 
Total 68 100 Table III: Recommendations of Analyst Appointees 
This table reports the distribution of recommendations of analysts. There are five distinct levels of recommendations, ranging between Strong Sell and Strong Buy.  Panel A 
reports the distribution of recommendations issued by analysts who are appointed to the board, on those firms that appoint the analyst to the board.  Panel B reports the 
distribution of all other recommendations on the I/B/E/S tape. Panel C reports the distribution of recommendations by analysts who are not appointed to the board, on 
those firms that appoint an analyst to the board. Panel D reports the distribution of recommendation by analysts who are appointed to the board, on all the stocks they 
cover excluding the firm who appoints them to the board. Chi-square tests for equality of distributions between the comparison groups are given in each panel, along with 
p-values.  
 
  Panel A    Panel B Panel C Panel D
  Appointed 
recommendations 
  All other recommendations All recommendations on 
firms appointing analysts to 
the board
All recommendations by 
analysts appointed to a 
board
  %  Cum %    % Diff Cum % % Diff  Cum % % Diff Cum %
Strong Buy  41.7  41.7    25.2 16.5 25.2 24.8 17.0  24.8 26.6 15.1 26.6
Buy 40.3  82.0    31.7 8.6 56.9 31.6 8.7  56.4 38.2 2.1 64.8
Hold 15.8  97.8    37.0 -21.2 93.9 38.0 -22.2  94.4 31.5 -15.6 96.2
Sell 2.2  100.0    4.0 -1.8 97.9 3.6 -1.5  98.0 2.8 -0.7 99.0
Strong Sell  0.0  100.0    2.1 -2.1 100.0 2.0 -2.0  100.0 1.0 -1.0 100.0
                      
Chi-square         39.2  39.8   23.6
P-value         0.00  0.00   0.00
 
 Table IV: Appointed Analyst Recommendations 
The dependent variable in each regression is the level of recommendation, which ranges between 1 and 5, and which we 
reverse-score such that 1=Strong Sell, 2=Sell, 3=Hold, 4=Buy, and 5=Strong Buy. The key variable of interest is in the 
first row: Appointed Rec equals 1 if the analyst recommending the stock in question is subsequently appointed to the board 
of directors of that firm, and 0 otherwise.  The other independent variables are as follows: Size measures the log(ME) and 
B/M measures the log(BE/ME), of the firm being recommended. Past Month Return and Past Year Return measure the 
given stock’s return in the prior month, and 11-months prior to that month respectively, from the recommendation date. 
Brokerage Size is the total number of analysts that work at the given analyst’s brokerage house. At the time of each 
recommendation, Experience measures an analyst’s history of recommending stocks on I/B/E/S (in years), while Exper. Rec. 
Firm measures the number of years an analyst has been recommending a given stock. All Star is a categorical variable equal 
to 1 if the analyst was voted an all star analyst in the October issue of Institutional Investor magazine for the given year.  
Connected to Firm is a categorical variable equal to 1 if the analyst attended the same school as one of the senior officers of 
the firm being recommended.  Affiliation is a categorical variable that measures whether or not the given firm has an 
underwriting relationship with the analyst’s brokerage. Column 7 and 8 split our sample period to pre- and post-Reg FD 
(October 2000).  Column 9 runs an ordered logit regression, where the left hand side variable is the recommendation level 
(1-5). Fixed effects for recommendation month (Time), for industry (Industry) using the Fama-French industry definitions, 
for the firm (Firm), and for the analyst (Analyst), are included where indicated. All standard errors are adjusted for 
clustering at the recommendation month level, and t-stats using these clustered standard errors are included in parentheses 
below the coefficient estimates. 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance are indicated with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
         Pre- 
Reg FD 
Post-
Reg FD  Logit 










  (5.90) (5.14)  (4.70)  (5.19)  (5.14) (3.21)  (2.10)  (2.29)  (4.16) 
 
Size 





***  0.088  0.120
***  0.020
** 
   (1.44) (12.54) (3.14)  (8.13)  (7.53) (4.76) (6.83)  (2.39) 




*** -0.006 -0.020 0.013 -0.120
***
   (9.10) (4.66) (7.82) (3.38) (0.57) (0.88) (0.97)  (9.45) 








   (8.60) (8.50) (8.72) (6.50) (3.06) (2.83) (0.16)  (2.65) 









   (12.69) (12.77) (12.67) (12.29)  (8.51) (4.03) (6.36) (11.25) 








   (6.93) (4.43) (6.94) (6.33) (8.23) (0.29) (8.55)  (8.78) 
Experience   0.004
*** -0.024
*** 0.003
*** 0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.001 -0.008
   (3.25) (3.22) (2.84) (1.63) (1.04) (0.40) (0.51)  (1.60) 









   (13.55) (15.44) (14.08)  (9.41)  (6.25) (3.61) (3.41)  (6.45) 




   (1.08) (0.33) (0.94) (0.52) (0.14) (2.22) (3.03)  (4.44) 
Connected to Firm      -0.015 -0.025  -0.011 -0.001
     (1.26) (1.16) (0.71)  (0.04) 









   (8.53) (6.50) (7.85) (6.56) (5.04) (3.09) (3.23) (10.59) 
Fixed Effect    Time  Time Time Time Time Time Time
Fixed Effect      Analyst Industry Firm Firm Firm FirmTable V: Wrong Bets 
The dependent variable in each regression is Wrong Bet.  Wrong Bet measures incorrect calls by analysts, and is a 
categorical variable equal to 1 if i.) the analyst recommends a Buy or Strong Buy on the given stock and the price decline 
over the following year or ii.) the analyst recommends a Sell or Strong Sell on the given stock and the price rises over the 
following year.  It is defined equivalently in Columns 5-8 with the addition that the given recommendation is an upgrade or 
downgrade from the prevailing consensus recommendation, and then tracking subsequent performance of the stock.   
Appointed Rec equals 1 if the analyst recommending the stock in question is subsequently appointed to the board of 
directors of that firm, and 0 otherwise.  The other independent variables are as follows: Size measures the log(ME) and B/M 
measures the log(BE/ME), of the firm being recommended. Past Month Return and Past Year Return measure the given 
stock’s return in the prior month, and 11-months prior to that month respectively, from the recommendation date. 
Brokerage Size is the total number of analysts that work at the given analyst’s brokerage house. At the time of each 
recommendation, Experience measures an analyst’s history of recommending stocks on I/B/E/S (in years), while Exper. Rec. 
Firm measures the number of years an analyst has been recommending a given stock. All Star is a categorical variable equal 
to 1 if the analyst was voted an all star analyst in the October issue of Institutional Investor magazine for the given year. 
Connected to Firm is a categorical variable equal to 1 if the analyst attended the same school as one of the senior managers 
or board members of the recommended firm.  Affiliation is a categorical variable that measures whether or not the given 
firm has an underwriting relationship with the analyst’s brokerage.  Fixed effects for recommendation month (Time), for the 
firm (Firm), and for the analyst (Analyst), are included where indicated. All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at 
the recommendation month level, and t-stats using these clustered standard errors are included in parentheses below the 
coefficient estimates. 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance are indicated with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Rec Rec Rec  Up/Down Up/Down   Up/Down
Appointed Rec  0.123**  0.172*** 0.154*** 0.148*** 0.170***  0.165***




0.136***      0.064*** 
   (16.87)    (14.40) 
B/M   -0.020***   -0.002
   (5.33)    (0.51) 
Past Month Return    0.018   0.029**
   (0.99)    (2.20) 
Past Year Return    0.023***   0.009***
   (8.12)    (4.30) 
Brokerage Size    0.000***   0.000***
   (3.30)    (4.72) 
Experience   -0.001   -0.002***
   (1.60)    (3.92) 
Exper. Rec. Firm    -0.002   0.002
   (1.63)    (1.64) 
All Star    0.014***   0.015***
   (3.18)    (2.89) 
Affiliation   0.028*   0.021*
   (1.69)    (1.78) 
Fixed Effect  Time  Time Time Time Time Time
Fixed Effect  Analyst  Firm Firm Analyst Firm  FirmTable VI: Appointed Analyst Recommendation Performance 
The dependent variable in each column is the one-year return following a recommendation change (Upgrade or Downgrade). 
In columns 1-3, the changes are upgrades from consensus (Upgrade), and in columns 4-6, the changes are downgrades from 
consensus (Downgrade). The key variable of interest is the interaction term in the first two rows:  Appointed Rec*Upgrade 
(Downgrade), which equals 1 if the analyst recommending the stock in question is subsequently appointed to the board of 
directors of that firm, and the recommendation in question is an upgrade (or downgrade) from consensus.  Dummy variables 
for Appointed Rec and Upgrade (Downgrade) are also included. The other independent variables are those used in Table IV, 
and are described there.  Fixed effects for recommendation year (Time), and for the analyst (Analyst), are included where 
indicated. All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the recommendation year level, and t-stats using these clustered 
standard errors are included in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance are 
indicated with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Appointed Rec*Upgrade  -0.195** -0.182** -0.146**  




-0.038 0.050 0.063 
      (0.50)  (0.57)  (0.67) 
Upgrade 0.094*** 0.073*** 0.039***  
  (3.12) (3.57) (2.97)       
Downgrade   0.013 0.017  0.000
      (0.61)  (0.95)  (0.01) 
Appointing Rec  0.133* 0.127** 0.106* 0.014 0.016  0.017
  (1.82) (2.21) (1.86)  (0.22)  (0.35)  (0.35) 
Size 0.015* 0.011 0.015** 0.017** 0.012*  0.016**
  (1.83) (1.55) (2.28)  (2.05)  (1.67)  (2.35) 
B/M 0.076** 0.074*** 0.059*** 0.079** 0.076***  0.060***
  (2.47) (3.03) (2.78)  (2.49)  (3.04)  (2.81) 
Past Month Return  0.000  -0.001*** 0.000 0.000 -0.001***  0.000
  (1.33) (3.75) (1.32)  (1.43)  (3.77)  (1.32) 
Past Year Return  -0.001  0.000 -0.011 -0.002 0.000  -0.012*
  (0.33) (0.01) (1.70)  (0.36)  (0.01)  (1.74) 
Brokerage Size  0.012* 0.009* 0.006 0.013* 0.010*  0.006
  (1.68) (1.69) (1.23)  (1.76)  (1.77)  (1.31) 
Experience 0.135** 0.042 -0.004 0.135** 0.042  -0.004
  (1.99) (0.85) (0.07)  (1.97)  (0.84)  (0.09) 
Exper. Rec. Firm  0.011  -0.037 -0.053 0.005 -0.041  -0.055
  (0.11) (0.47) (0.77)  (0.06)  (0.53)  (0.82) 
All Star  0.023  0.008 0.004 0.024 0.009  0.005
  (1.35) (0.72) (0.47)  (1.38)  (0.86)  (0.52) 
Affiliation -0.138** -0.177** -0.140** -0.141** -0.179***  -0.140**
  (2.04) (2.82) (2.14)  (2.08)  (2.85)  (2.14) 
Recommendation Level  -0.055** -0.042** -0.016 -0.016 -0.010  0.000







 Table VII: Analyst Ability Ranking 
The dependent variable is a measure of analyst’s rank relative to the rest of her peer analysts. In all columns, this rank is 
normalized to between 1-100, with the higher ranks meaning better performance (with 100 being the top performer, 1 being 
the poorest).  In Columns 1-3, analysts are ranked according to their earnings forecast ability following Hong and Kubik 
(2003).  In Columns 4-6, analysts are ranked according to the predictive ability of their recommendations (upgrades and 
downgrades) for future returns, using the measure Wrong Bets as defined in Table IV.  In both measures the rankings are 
averaged across all stocks an analyst issues forecasts (or recommendations) on in a given year, giving an analyst level 
ranking for that year. Thus, observations are at an analyst-year level, so that every analyst-year will represent one 
observation. Firm Level Recommendation (Average Rec) is the average level of an analyst’s recommendations for a given 
year, which ranges between 1=Strong Sell and 5=Strong Buy. Affiliation is the average percentage of covered stocks with 
which the analyst’s brokerage house has an underwriting relationship. All Star is the percentage of years that the analyst is 
an all star out of all the years the analyst is issuing forecasts (recommendations).  The independent variables Experience, 
Exper Rec. Firm, Brokerage Size, Size, and B/M are described in Table IV, and are average across the analyst’s covered 
firms and years in the sample.  Fixed effects for year (Time) are included where indicated.  All standard errors are adjusted 
for clustering at the ranking year level, and t-stats using these clustered standard errors are included in parentheses below 
the coefficient estimates.  1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance are indicated with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 Earnings  Earnings Earnings Recommend Recommend Recommend
Appointed Analyst  -5.625***  -5.640*** -3.896*** -5.279*** -5.514***  -3.014**
  (4.16) (4.16) (3.26)  (3.81)  (4.07)  (2.03) 
Average Rec    3.658***   0.153
     (9.12)      (0.17) 
Num Analysts    -1.153***   -0.428***
     (5.50)      (5.30) 
All Star    -2.401***   -5.745***
     (3.33)      (11.78) 
Affiliation   -5.528   7.309
     (0.86)      (1.46) 
Experience   -0.414***   -0.741***
     (3.18)      (6.19) 
Exper. Rec. Firm    -1.344***   -0.099
     (4.35)      (0.39) 
Brokerage Size    0.012*   0.008**
     (1.80)      (1.95) 
Size   8.339***   -1.315***
     (12.95)      (5.57) 
B/M   1.021   0.615*
     (1.52)      (1.69) 
          







 Table VIII: Timing of Analysts’ Positive Recommendations 
This table reports panel regressions of analyst recommendations. The dependent variable in columns 1-3 is the level of 
recommendation (Rec), which ranges from 1=Strong Sell to 5=Strong Buy. In columns 4 and 5, the dependent variable is 
Downgrade, which is a categorical variable equal to 1 if the recommendation is a downgrade from the current consensus, and 
0 otherwise. The independent variable Appointed Rec is a categorical variable that is equal to 1 if the analyst recommending 
the given stock is subsequently appointed to the board of directors of the firm, and 0 otherwise. Last Rec. Downgrade is 
equal to 1 if the last recommendation on the stock (before the given analyst’s recommendation) was a downgrade, and 0 
otherwise. High Short Interest is equal to 1 if short interest in the month prior to the given recommendation was higher 
than the median, and 0 otherwise. High Future Issuance is equal to 1 if the firm being recommended has higher than median 
issuance over the 6 months following recommendation, and 0 otherwise. Interaction effects are included where shown. Size, 
B/M, Past Month Return, Past Year Return, Brokerage Size, Experience, Exper. Rec. Firm, All Star, and Affiliation are 
also included as controls in every regression, and are described in Table IV. Fixed effects for recommendation month (Time) 
and the firm (Firm) are included where indicated. All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the recommendation 
month level, and t-stats using these clustered standard errors are included in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance are indicated with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)
  Rec Rec Rec  Downgrade  Downgrade
Appointed Rec  0.378*** 0.279** 0.230* -0.171***  -0.023
  (4.22) (2.51) (1.73)    (3.06)  (0.31) 
Last Rec. Downgrade  -0.064*** -0.064*** -0.064*** 0.069***  0.069***
  (13.50) (13.49) (13.49)    (19.24)  (19.25) 
High Short Interest  -0.083*** -0.083*** -0.083*** 0.027***  0.027***
  (14.11) (14.12) (14.11)   (8.99)  (8.99) 
High Future Issuance  0.066*** 0.066*** 0.066*** -0.018***  -0.018***
  (15.06) (15.06) (15.05)   (7.50)  (7.50) 
High Short*Appointed Rec  0.326**     
   (2.14)       
High Issue*Appointed Rec   0.303**  
     (2.10)       
Last Rec Down*Appointed Rec    -0.259***












Firm Table IX: Firm Behavior and Performance, Post-Appointment 
Panel A reports regressions of discretionary accruals over our sample period, 1993-2006. Discretionary accruals are computed 
using the modified Jones model described in Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995), and are equal to the residuals from firm-
level regressions of total accruals on non-discretionary accruals (which are equal to the change in sales minus the change in 
receivables plus gross property, plant, and equipment, all scaled by last year’s total assets). Total Accruals are the total 
annual amount of accruals of the firm, estimated as in Healy (1985). These regressions include only those firms that appoint 
an analyst as a board member (402 firm-year observations).  The independent variable of interest is After Appointment, a 
categorical variable equal to 1 for those firm-years after the analyst has been appointed to the board, and zero otherwise.  
Size, B/M, Return Volatility, and Past Year Return are defined as in Table VIII. Earnings are measured as the current 
year’s net income, before extraordinary items. Firm fixed effects (Firm) and year fixed effects (Time) are included where 
indicated.  All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the year level, and t-stats using these clustered standard errors 
are included in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. Panel B presents value-weighted calendar-time monthly portfolio 
returns for two portfolios (After Appointment and Non-Appointment), as well as for a spread portfolio (Spread) which goes 
long the After Appointment portfolio and short the Non-Appointment portfolio each month. Firms that appoint analysts to 
the board enter the After Appointment portfolio in the month following their appointment, and remain in the portfolio for a 
year; all other stocks are placed in the Non-Appointment portfolio. 3-factor (Fama and French (1996), 4-factor (Carhart 
(1997), and 5-factor (Pastor and Stambaugh (2003)) alphas are computed, and 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance are 




















Panel A: Discretionary Accruals Post-Appointment 
Dep Variable:  Discretionary Accruals 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
After Appointment  0.022** 0.022** 0.019** 0.021** 0.021**  0.030** 
  (2.06) (2.27) (2.12) (2.23) (2.29)  (2.51) 
Total Accruals  0.206** 0.202** 0.266** 0.266**  0.265** 
    (2.58) (2.63) (2.16) (2.13)  (2.09) 
Size  -0.005 -0.003 -0.003  -0.002 
      (0.91) (0.53) (0.50)  (0.28) 
B/M  0.000 0.002 0.002  0.  005 
      (0.02) (0.26) (0.33)  (0.68) 
Return Volatility  -0.109* -0.109* -0.157*** 
      (1.72)  (1.95)  (2.72) 
Past Year Return  0.000 0.000 
       (0.03)  (0.01) 
Earnings   0.000 
        ( 0 . 3 0 )  
Fixed Effect  Time Time Time Time Time Time 
Fixed Effect  Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm 









   
After Appointment  -0.0052 -0.0177** -0.0161* -0.0198** 
  (0.60) (2.08)  (1.89)  (2.21) 
Non-Appointment 0.0079** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 










(2.21) Table X: Post-Appointment Behavior: Instrumental Variables and Matched Samples 
The first three columns of Panel A report results from two-stage least squares regressions that instrument for the 
appointment for a cheerleader.  These regressions include only those firms that appoint an analyst as a board member.  The 
first stage of this regression (Column 1) is a regression of actual appointment months (of cheerleader analysts) on a 
categorical variable Post-Global Settlement that is equal to 1 for those years directly after the Global Settlement (April 
2003-April 2005), and zero otherwise, plus the same control variables used in Table IX. The firm-month with the maximum 
predicted value of appointment is then designated as the instrumented appointment date, and the variable Instrumented 
After Appointment is then a categorical variable equal to 1 for those firm-years after the instrumented appointment date.  
The second stage regression in Column 2 (Column 3) is a regression of discretionary accruals (non-discretionary accruals) on 
the variable Instrumented After Appointment plus the same control variables used in Column 1.  Columns 4 and 5 of Panel 
A compare the results in Table IX to those obtained from a matched sample panel regression of discretionary accruals on the 
same After Appointment variable described in Table IX. Column 4 repeats the same result shown in Column 6 Panel A of 
Table IX which regresses discretionary accruals on the After Appointment variable described in Table IX for the sample of 
appointing firms; Column 5 runs the identical regression, but this time on a matched sample of firms designed to mimic the 
characteristics of the appointing firms.  The matched sample is constructed by matching appointing firms to firms in the 
same Fama-French 49 industry category, same size quintile, same book-to-market quintile, and same discretionary accruals 
quintile, but who did *not* appoint a cheerleader in the year of a cheerleader appointment. Panel B repeats the 
instrumental variables regressions in Columns 1 and 2 of Panel A, except that the control variable for total accruals is 
removed in both stages, and the dependent variable in the second-stage regression in Column 2 is now total CEO 
compensation (the variable TDC2 as reported in Execucomp). Firm fixed effects (Firm) and year fixed effects (Time) are 
included where indicated.  All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the year level (month level in Column 1), and t-












Panel A: IV Accruals Behavior and Matched Sample
  IV Estimation  Matched-Sample
  1st Stage  2nd Stage    2nd Stage  Our Matched
       Sample Sample
Dependent Variable:  Appoint Date  Disc Accr    Non-Disc  Disc Accr  Disc Accr
  (1) (2)    (3)    (4)  (5) 
Post-Global  -0.014***      
Settlement  (2.57)            
              
Instrumented After   0.018***  -0.028   
Appointment     (2.71)   (0.94)       
        
After       0.030**  0.003 
Appointment        (2.51)  (0.75) 
    
Controls Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes
Fixed Effect    Time Time Time  Time











Panel B: IV Compensation Behavior  
  1st Stage  2nd Stage   
Dependent Variable: Appoint Date  Compensation   
  (1) (2)   
Post-Global  -0.012***    
Settlement  (2.62)    
      
Instrumented After  4554*   
Appointment    
(1.85)  
Controls Yes Yes  
Fixed Effect  Time  
Fixed Effect  Firm Firm  